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By the time troops of China's People's Liberation Army join
in the ceremonies to mark China's resumption of sovereignty over
Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, many of the most critical changes
defining Hong Kong's future will already have been accomplished.
A shadow legislature, handpicked by a Beijing-appointed commit-
tee, began meeting across the border in Shenzen on January 25.
Hong Kong's next chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, who was also
picked by Beijing, has gone on record strongly backing proposals
to do away with twenty-five of Hong Kong's laws which
guarantee human rights, political expression, and free speech. An
eleven-member inner cabinet that will run Hong Kong after
China's resumption of sovereignty is made up almost entirely of
pro-Beijing figures, including a former official from the Hong
Kong office of the "New China News Agency," which up to now
has acted as China's informal embassy in Hong Kong. Beijing
may be sincere in its contention that Hong Kong can continue as
a Special Autonomous Region ("S.A.R.") under the principle of
"one country, two systems," but it is not taking any chances when
it comes to deciding who is going to run the system.
To see how these developments will affect daily life in Hong
Kong it may be necessary to wait six months to a year. The
question which Hong Kong's six-million citizens are pondering in
the final countdown to Britain's withdrawal is whether the
territory's vitality and free wheeling entrepreneurial spirit will
survive the inevitable osmosis that threatens to take place when
a wealthy, but politically weak, society comes into direct contact
with one that is both poor and backwards but also overwhelming-
ly powerful. It may still be too early to predict how the
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unknown variables in Hong Kong's situation will ultimately play
out. What is clear is that Hong Kong's future will depend on a
number of complex relationships with different political forces.
Marc Faber, a Hong Kong-based investor who publishes a
provocative and frequently humorous financial newsletter called
the "Gloom and Doom Report," compares Hong Kong's predica-
ment to that of a fat mouse locked in a room with a ravenous cat.
It is in the mouse's interest, Faber points out, to make certain that
the cat remains well-fed.' Faber's image is apt, but it may not go
far enough. To push the metaphor a bit, there could turn out to
be more than one cat in the room, a development that would
complicate the mouse's life considerably. An example of this kind
of scenario is provided in a recent study by Political and Econom-
ic Risk Consultancy, Ltd., which suggests that the People's
Liberation Army could very well become a force to contend with
along with the civilian authorities in Beijing.2 If the PLA were
to exert political pressure in order to protect its own business
interests, local business interests might try to play the PLA,
Beijing, and the S.A.R.'s new chief executive off against each other
in the hopes of gaining commercial advantages. The result could
be a degeneration into administrative gang warfare with several
factions vying for power.
Probably the single greatest factor that makes it difficult to
predict Hong Kong's future is the difficulty of predicting China's
future in the wake of the death of its political patriarch, Deng
Xiaoping. Prior to his death, Deng was clearly too incapacitated
to play any active role in deciding policy, but many of the people
he brought to power continued to exert significant influence. To
a certain extent, these leaders formed a sort of shadow administra-
tion with no leader which was essentially frozen in time. Their
legitimacy stemmed from policies created by Deng. They could
recycle Deng's speeches, but they lacked the legitimacy to go
much further. Even China's president Jiang Zemin, who has
clearly tried to put his own stamp on the government, was limited
by the situation. As long as Deng was alive, Jiang was forced to
remain in the shadow not just of the man, but also of his policies.
The resulting paradox was that this state of semi-paralysis often
1 Telephone interview with Marc Faber (Mar. 7, 1997).
2 See POLTICAL AND ECONOMIC RISK CONSULTANCY, 1996 COUNTRY
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forced Chinese leaders to take a harsher stand than they might
otherwise have chosen. In terms of domestic Chinese politics, no
one wanted to risk appearing less forceful than Deng might have
been or to show any sign of deviating from his political line. The
British understood early on that this was one of the main reasons
that negotiations over Hong Kong usually ended in an acrimoni-
ous stalemate. As one British negotiator put it, "Only Deng
would have been secure enough to make compromises."
Deng's death does not necessarily make Hong Kong's situation
any easier. Not only is there uncertainty about who will
ultimately take the reins of power, but there is also the fact that
Deng's disappearance will very likely bring on a fundamental
structural change in China's leadership with a number of factions
vying for power. In that scenario, Hong Kong's new chief
executive will have to pick his alliances carefully.
Given the enormous number of unpredictable variables in its
future, it is not surprising that Hong Kong's population feels
increasingly nervous. Chinese officials haven't helped matters
much. In the last year, there has been a nearly constant stream of
conflicting remarks concerning individual rights, freedom of the
press and the rule of law, culminating with the recent decision to
drop many of the protections legislated into the law by the
British. The underlying message is clear: China and Britain have
different concepts concerning the rights that should be granted to
individual citizens, and anyone who wants to cause trouble by
challenging Beijing's policies risks being dealt with severely.
Chinese dissidents who escaped to Hong Kong after the massacre
at Tiananmen Square have understood the message; at least 90
have already been granted political asylum elsewhere.
At this point it is probably safe to say that a significant sector
of public opinion sees much of the recent squabbling over the
future of Hong Kong's political institutions as something of a side
show. That is partly because the public has been excluded from
politics for most of Hong Kong's history. Until a few years ago,
ordinary citizens were not entitled to vote for members of Legco;
instead, they were hand picked by the governor or chosen by
functional constituencies representing the major institutions in
Hong Kong's business world. The average citizen was content to
live under what turned out to be a relatively benevolent system
and concentrate on Hong Kong's real passion, which is business.
The important question in many people's minds now is
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whether it will be possible to keep on concentrating on business
if China insists on cracking down on individual liberties.
Pro-democracy activists insist that inhibiting Hong Kong's free
lifestyle will have a serious impact on Hong Kong's dynamic
approach to business. Many westerners agree. What has made
Hong Kong, they insist, is its human talent, and if that goes,
everything else will fall apart. British journalist Robert Cottrell
captures this notion in his book, The End of Hong Kong. "Hong
Kong," Cottrell writes, "was created not by Britain and China,
but by Britons liberated from the obligations of Britain and by
Chinese liberated from the obligations of China."3
Similar arguments have appeared in countless articles both in
Hong Kong and in other countries. But skeptics charge that this
line of reasoning may be missing an important point - if Hong
Kong is booming today, it is not so much because of its brilliant
business men as it is because China has finally decided to open
itself to world trade with a vengeance. Hong Kong is strategically
positioned to get a major cut of the action. Hong Kong is, quite
simply, the best way for westerners to get into China, and it is
largely that which makes it the powerhouse that it is.
The argument that Chinese blunders on human rights and
press freedoms will put an end to Hong Kong's role as an
important city for business is weakened considerably by the fact
that many foreign companies are leapfrogging over Hong Kong
and setting up operations directly in Shanghai and Beijing. Where
enormous profits are concerned, businessmen will put up with a
great deal, and there is no reason to expect that Hong Kong will
be any different. Hong Kong's real advantage, and the ingredient
that will probably keep it from being surpassed by Shanghai for
some time to come, is its well-oiled infrastructure. In contrast,
Shanghai has developed so chaotically in the last few years that
many people find it hard to get to work. Hong Kong has an
added advantage of having one of China's best deep water ports,
while Shanghai is situated on the banks of a muddy river.
Despite the incoming regime's ominous statements on human
rights and political freedoms, there are a number of mitigating
factors that should also make at least the early stages of Hong
Kong's transition go fairly smoothly and give Hong Kong's next
government the maneuvering space it needs to establish at least a
3 ROBERT COTTRELL, THE END OF HONG KONG 4 (1993).
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limited autonomy. The first is that, as far as business is con-
cerned, Hong Kong's integration with China is already well
advanced. The Bank of China already issues Hong Kong dollars
along with two British-owned banks. Beijing-owned holding
companies, and in particular CITIC-Pacific, the Hong Kong
subsidiary of China's huge state-owned China Industrial Trust and
Investment Corporation, owns substantial holdings in hundreds
of Hong Kong companies. For their part, many foreign compa-
nies have openly welcomed Chinese investment as a protection
against the future.
A second factor that should help ease the transition is that
Britain has gone out of its way in the last few years to give Hong
Kong's administration a separate identity. For several years, Hong
Kong has hired its own civil servants on a separate track from the
Foreign office. The territory maintains its own trade offices in
major world cities and has negotiated its own trade agreements for
a long time. Ironically, this was partly at the insistence of British
textile manufacturers who feared that Hong Kong would undercut
them if it were considered an actual part of Britain. Gerald Segal,
a senior analyst at the London-based Institute of Strategic Studies
and author of The Fate ofHong Kong, points out that once Britain
realized that it was not going to be able to keep Hong Kong, it set
about discretely trying to give certain Chinese officials an added
advantage in establishing themselves in the future hierarchy.
4
The gamble was that, once in position, these officials would be
more likely to be friendly to the west.
These strategies sound reasonable enough; whether they will
actually work is another question. Few outgoing British nationals
seem genuinely convinced that Britain will have much of a future
in Hong Kong once the Chinese are in control. One of the jokes
often repeated in British expatriate circles these days captures the
mood: "Perhaps people wouldn't keep talking about killing the
goose that laid the golden egg, if there weren't so many decapitat-
ed geese lying around."
Even if the transition proceeds smoothly, no one has any
illusions about the fact that Hong Kong is going to be caught up
in a wrenching reversal of its political and cultural orientation.
Instead of a western outpost on the flank of China, Hong Kong
is already becoming a kind of Asian neutral zone in which
4 See GERALD SEGAL, THE FATE Op HONG KONG (1993).
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westerners appear as supplicants.
The reversal is already placing many Chinese in Hong Kong's
current hierarchy in an uncomfortable position. They are
expected to continue to show loyalty to the outgoing British
administration, but at the same time they have had to start
establishing a relationship with the people who will soon be
running Hong Kong. The actions of Christine Loh, one of the
most articulate members of Legco, demonstrate the effects of this
unusual situation. Just a year ago, Loh was adamantly opposed to
China's handling of the transition, but in April she began to
abstain from votes critical of China. In September, she joined a
committee of the Better Hong Kong Foundation, a pro-Beijing
business group. The message was clear: to stay active in Hong
Kong means making an arrangement of one kind or another with
the new regime.
For westerners trying to make it in Hong Kong, the rules have
already started to change. Many Hong Kong companies are
searching for qualified Asian staff to replace suddenly less
fashionable Caucasians. The Chinese stockbroker wife of an
Australian businessman recently remarked to her husband, "you
are finished here. This is our time to run things." She was not
asking for a divorce, she was merely making a statement of fact.
Another sign of shifting loyalties is a less than subtle rewriting of
history. A Chinese-American couple who recently visited Hong
Kong were amazed at how in Hong Kong Chinese conversations
the "barren rock" which the British believe they turned into an
economic miracle now appears to be evolving, thanks to
pro-Beijing propaganda, into a weight used by colonialists to
prolong Asian poverty.
All of this is hard for most westerners to swallow, and it is
particularly hard to digest for anyone who bought into governor
Chris Patten's last minute efforts to set up some semblance of
democratic institutions in Hong Kong. Patten's failure to connect
with Chinese in both Beijing and Hong Kong's business communi-
ty is one of the paradoxes of the colony's last days. Although
Patten's efforts at democratic reforms appear to have been
genuine, it is safe to say that few Hong Kong Chinese business-
men will mourn his departure.
Patten, who comes from a parliamentary background in which
issues are clearly defined through public debate, hoped that
involving the public in the process of government would turn out
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to be Hong Kong's greatest protection. To many Hong Kong
Chinese, however, Patten's confrontational approach appeared
divisive and hollow, especially since England made it quite clear
that it could not do anything to guarantee that any democratic
reforms would be maintained after China took over. Basically
suspicious of the English from the start, Chinese officials in
Beijing simply dismissed Patten's reform proposals as nothing
more than an attempt to change the rules of the game now that
England no longer has anything to gain. In the final countdown
to the turnover, Patten has become largely irrelevant.
For most of the rest of the world, the main question to be
asked about Hong Kong now is whether it will be possible to
keep on doing business as before - and will it be worth it, given
the restrictions and obstacles that China seems likely to impose?
The most probable answer is that as long as China needs western
capital it will try to make Hong Kong bearable. The market in
China promises to be so enormous, not just because it has a
billion potential consumers, but because to survive China is going
to have to build the infrastructure for a modern country. It is a
safe bet that the potential profits involved in doing this will draw
many businesses regardless of the social consequences. A number
of important western firms have opted to stay on in Hong Kong
despite the turnover just to be near the action.
In the final analysis, business has really been what Hong Kong
is all about. A frequent quip from young traders is, "if you aren't
making money, what are you doing here?" It is hard to imagine
any place since America's Wild West that offers such dynamic
business opportunities. To even a casual observer, China now
looks very much the Wild East. Just as our own robber barons
exploited the Wild West, China and Hong Kong are developing
a broad sampling of their own swashbucklers.
In the only real game in town, it is not the written law that
counts as much as the player's understanding of the undercurrents
and dynamics of power - and the carefully built relationships
between people that the Chinese refer to as Guang Xi, or
connections. It is quite possible that the most important change
that will take place on July 1 will be the entry of Hong Kong
into the game for real. Life may not be as agreeable or secure as
it was under the British, but, for the first time, Hong Kong will
be immersed in its true environment without cultural walls to set
it off. Hong Kong will no longer be a western enclave, but will
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not quite be a no-man's land, either. It may not be as comfort-
able as it once was, but it will still be a focal point for business in
China - and not a bad place to become involved in the action.
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